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ABSTRACT 
Municipal councils are vested with the legal authority to promote financial accountability in 
their respective municipalities. To accomplish this responsibility, municipal council 
establishes committees to enable a structured and coordinated mechanism through which it 
can promote financial accountability effectively.  However and despite the available legal 
and institutional mechanisms established to enable council committees to promote financial 
accountability, the lack of effective financial accountability in municipalities has persisted.  
This study focused on the role of council committees in ensuring financial accountability.  It 
was guided by the following research questions:  What are the major factors that contribute 
to financial accountability at local level, what is the role of council committees in promoting 
financial accountability and how can council committees be strengthened to play an 
effective role in Stellenbosch municipality’s municipal financial accountability.  Stellenbosch 
Local Municipality was used as a case study for this research. The data was collected from 
primary and secondary sources. Primary data was sourced from members of relevant 
council committees through structured and unstructured interviews.  Secondary data was 
obtained from relevant municipal reports, internet sources, government department 
publications, journals and Auditor - General’s reports which contributed to the reliability, 
validity and objectivity of the findings.  The findings showed that political instability, a lack of 
a culture of accountability, lack of clearly defined authority for accountability, lack of 
relevant capacity and willingness are some of the major factors that have impacted 
negatively on council committees from promoting effective financial accountability.  The 
study opens up the possibility of future research to include a wider number of 
municipalities. 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Background 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on the legislative oversight role and responsibilities of municipal council 
committees at the local sphere in South Africa, Western Cape and specifically in 
Stellenbosch Municipality to ensure policy implementation and accountability.  This chapter 
provides the background to the study, the research question and objectives guiding the 
research.  It explains the reasons for using the specific research methodology and the 
collection of data and the analysis thereof. 
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
Post 1994 the South African state was reconfigured into three spheres, national, provincial 
and local to give effect to the Constitution of 1996. Constitutional powers were bestowed on 
each of these spheres (South Africa, 1996).  Local government in particular for the first time 
in the history of South Africa was constitutionally empowered as autonomous or 
independent spheres of government.   The local sphere of government by default is viewed 
as the delivery arm of the government.  In the main this is because the local level is nearest 
to people and therefore perceived to be solely responsible for the delivery of basic services. 
Many of the service delivery deficiencies rightfully or wrongfully are placed at the door of 
local government.    
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During the up run to the 2011 municipal election community service delivery protest was 
directed at local government.  Politicians and communities alike pointed fingers at the local 
level for failing to deliver on its constitutional mandate (Cape Times April, 2011).  Local 
government undeniably has an important role to fulfill in the democratic system that 
emerged in post-apartheid South Africa.  The transformation of local government probably 
had been the largest undertaking within the entire democratic transformation process since 
1994. (State of Local Government in South Africa, Overview Report, 2009: 12).   
 
 
The number of municipalities had been reduced from 1200 to 283 over a six year period.  
Previously an autonomous municipality has been merged with one another.  The merged 
institutions were fraught with organisational challenges, amongst other different policies, 
financial and human resource capacity constraints as well as different management 
systems.  Accompanying these was national pressure placed on municipalities to play a 
meaningful role in redressing the past inherited service delivery inequalities. These 
pressures were exerted through the promulgation of national legislations such as Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 Section 4 (2) (f) to direct the affairs of the 
local level.  The major challenges for the newly established municipalities were to deliver 
services and to simultaneously consolidate organisationally.    
 
Many municipalities due to capacity constraints and institutional challenges failed to live up 
to the constitutional expectations resulting in many people not being much better off than 
under the apartheid regime. South Africa’s municipal councils are seen as cornerstones of 
local democracy and legitimacy.  As local elected assemblies, municipal councils are key 
structures endowed with the law making, representation and financial accountability powers 
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and functions in terms of section 151 of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa(RSA), 
1996 (Act 108 of 1996).    
The combination of these functions position municipal councils to play a critical role in 
ensuring accountability of the executive and bureaucratic structures of the municipality.  
 
 
The municipal council’s authority to promote financial accountability is of immense 
importance considering the limited financial resources in municipalities.  Municipal Council 
legislative oversight had been delegated to Section 79 Council Committees.   Section 79 
Council Committees are established in terms of Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (Act 117 
of 1998) to act on behalf of the council.  The number of Council Committees varies within 
municipalities and is chaired by the political head.   The committees comprise of politicians 
and elected public representative. The delegated responsibilities of these sections 79 
Council Committees are to ensure administrative accountability for the implementation of 
council policy (Local Government: Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (Act 117 of 1998).     
As a result of the intense criticism directed at local government for failing to deliver on its 
Constitutional mandate, a necessity arises for in-depth study to assess the role of Municipal 
Council Committees in ensuring policy implementation and accountability. Similarly, there is 
a need to identify and develop an understanding of the factors that negate the effectiveness 
of these council committees.   
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1.3 RESEARCH STATEMENT 
The need to exercise good governance obligates the municipal council to promote financial 
accountability of the executive and administrative structures.  This is supported by various 
legal arrangements such as Section 152 (1) of the Constitution which vests the municipal 
council with the authority to promote financial accountability. It was envisaged that by 
entrenching the municipal council as the ultimate structure for ensuring financial 
accountability it will contribute towards sound financial management, responsiveness and 
accountability (Krafchick & Wehner, 1998:2). However, and despite the legally prescribed 
and accountability induced environment, the recent National State of Local Government 
Assessment Overview Report revealed that lack of financial accountability is still a major 
challenge in municipalities (Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs, 2009:10).   
 
While the municipal financial management challenges such as corruption, underspending, 
overspending, procurement irregularities implicate the municipal council, executive and the 
administrative structures, a greater deficit has been observed on the part of the municipal 
councils (Cooperative Governance & Traditional Affairs, 2009:10). These challenges 
persisted despite the establishment of committees that are supposed to assist the 
municipal council to promote financial accountability. However, it is the contention of the 
researcher that there are some underlying complicit factors that have not been sufficiently 
explored.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
It is has become necessary to identify these factors in order to contribute towards the 
search for possible solutions.  Ideally, a meaningful attempt to search for possible solutions 
should assist in identifying the factors that negatively affect municipal council and 
particularly the relevant council committees from promoting financial accountability.   
Therefore, a comprehensive study on the role of the council committees in ensuring 
financial accountability is necessary. This will enable an informed assessment of the 
council committees in respect of financial accountability. While this will contribute towards 
building the necessary literature on municipal financial accountability, it will also facilitate 
constructive and practical solutions to the challenges or failure to exercise effective 
municipal financial accountability 
   
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The study is guided by the following research questions: 
1. What are the major underlying factors that contribute to financial accountability at 
the local level?   
2.  What is the role of council committees in promoting financial accountability? 
3. What are the strength and weaknesses of Stellenbosch municipality’s municipal 
council committees? 
4.    How can council committees be strengthened to play an effective role in 
Stellenbosch municipality’s municipal financial accountability? 
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1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
The objectives of the study are: 
a) To analyse the legislative and regulatory framework that guides local financial 
accountability in South Africa. 
b) To contextualize the role of the council committees to ensure effective and efficient 
financial accountability. 
c) To identify key factors that impact positively and negatively on the role of the council 
committees entrusted with the responsibility to promote financial accountability. 
d) To put forward recommendations based on the findings and analysis of the research. 
 
 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The proposed research is significant for the following reasons; the study will contribute to 
the discourse on the legislative oversight role of Council committees in relation to financial 
sustainability and management of local resources. It will provide valuable insights into 
financial accountability deficiencies and contribute to strengthening policy formulation 
thereof. The findings of the research will enable policy makers and Stellenbosch 
Municipality to develop appropriate interventions to deal with the current financial 
weaknesses at the local level. 
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1. 7 METHODOLOGY 
1. 7.1 RESEARCH DESIGN  
The study is a qualitative one and the case study research design is the most appropriate 
to answer the research questions posed. It enables the researcher to carry out an empirical 
inquiry of the role of Council Committees and their operations in their own setting (Yin 
1981: 97-114). In addition, Bryman (1995: 27) states that a case study is suitable in a 
"study that is focus on understanding areas that are not well documented". Yin (2003:13) 
further indicates that a case study approach is useful when the study, such as this one, 
investigates “the what questions”. 
    
Bless & Higson-Smith (1995:43) concur that "cases expose the operational reality of 
organisations and allow one to bring out the strengths and weaknesses of such 
organisations and enhance one's chances of engaging or suggesting remedial action of 
such organisations".  The design is suitable since the study should benefit from an in-depth 
and holistic analysis of the role of the municipal council committees in promoting financial 
accountability. Similarly, understanding the role of municipal council committees in 
promoting financial accountability will require flexibility and critical engagement with the 
phenomena that is offered by a qualitative method (Durrheim, 1995:43). The qualitative 
method allowed the researcher to adequately assess the role that which the municipal 
council and its respective committees played in ensuring and promoting financial 
accountability. Consequently, the use of the qualitative methodology enabled the 
researcher to observe the operations of the municipal council committees in their own 
setting.    
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The triangulation methodology or multiple sources methods was used to enhance the 
validity, reliability and the objectivity of the findings and recommendations.  In order to 
achieve the research objectives data was collected from multiple sources.  The data was 
collected from primary and secondary sources.  Primary data was sourced from members 
of relevant council committees through structured and unstructured interviews. The 
questionnaire was the major data collection instrument used to guide the interviews.   The 
interviews were held with Council Chairpersons and members of the committees.  
Secondary data was obtained from relevant municipal reports, internet sources, 
government department publications, journals and Auditor-General’s reports. 
 
1.7.2 SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY   
The locus of the study was the Stellenbosch Local Municipality.  The study in particular 
focused on the Section 79 Committees, namely, Oversight Committee and Audit 
Committee established in terms of the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998).  This is 
because these committees are established by the municipal council to specifically promote 
or facilitate financial accountability. The Municipal Public Account Committee will not 
receive much attention due to the fact that Stellenbosch Municipality did not establish such 
a committee. The study will not cover the executive and administrative structures of the 
municipality.  Likewise the external financial accountability structures such as National and 
Provincial Standing Committees on Public Accounts, the Auditor-General and the Provincial 
Treasury will not receive attention in this study. Whilst the immediate focus of the study is 
on the two above- mentioned committees, this does not however imply that other statutory 
structures are insignificant players in the promotion of financial accountability.    
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1.7.3 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY  
The study is structured into six distinctive but interrelated chapters: 
Chapter 1 outlines the background, research statement, research objectives, methodology, 
research design, scope and delimitation, significance of the study and structure of the 
study.  
 
Chapter 2 The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the 
legislature's role in financial accountability. The second section uses the available literature 
to discuss the concept of accountability and financial accountability.   
 
 Chapter 3 The chapter provides an overview of the legislative and regulatory framework 
within which municipalities in South Africa function and the principles of accountability. 
 
Chapter 4 The chapter explores the design and methodology followed during fieldwork.  
The use of the qualitative research method is motivated as well as the choice of the case 
study approach.  
 
Chapter 5 The chapter provides a background overview of the Stellenbosch Municipality, 
as well as the research findings based on the interviews conducted. 
 
 Chapter 6: The chapter presents the analysis of the data collected in order to bring clarity 
to the research questions posed and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND APPROACHES ON 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Most modern democratic governments have constitutionally established legislatures, 
executive and administrative structures. In most of these countries, legislatures have the 
constitutional mandate to serve as legitimate representatives for the electorate.  In an effort 
to make legislatures meaningful players, they have an oversight role to enforce 
accountability of the executive. Therefore, the establishment and effective functioning of the 
legislature is extensively considered as the necessary condition for financial accountability 
and good governance in general. Furthermore, legislative committees are key institutional 
mechanisms and processes used by the legislature to exercise financial accountability over 
the executive.   
 
The chapter discusses the establishment, role and processes used by committees to 
promote financial accountability over the executive.  The main objective of the chapter is to 
provide a context and the theoretical grounding to be used to assess the role of council 
committees in promoting financial accountability.     
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2.2 THE LEGISLATURE AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
A broad definition of the concept of legislature is the body of elected representatives.  
Polsby (1975:36) defines the legislature as the formal assemblies of elected 
representatives.  Similarly, Mezey (1979:10) concurs that legislatures are a popularly 
elected representatives who hold their position as a result of an election.   Legislatures are 
widely regarded as the representatives of the people with the legitimate claim to participate 
in matters affecting the welfare of the people. As representatives of the people, legislatures 
are often entrusted with constitutional and or political activities which include law-making 
and accountability. Mezey (1979:43) supports this argument by identifying “law-making, 
representation and oversight” as the key functions of the legislature. 
  
Borthwick (2002:4) goes further to identify law-making, controlling of raising of taxes and 
spending of money, representing the population of the country and possibly influencing the 
composition of the government as some of the role of the legislature.  Since this role serve 
as the foundation for a parliamentary democracy to flourish, it can be argued that the 
legislature has the “ultimate responsibility for good governance and promoting a culture of 
accountability” (Sahgal, 2001:3).  Generally, the aspect of good governance has influenced 
the nature of the relationship between the legislature and the executive by putting the 
checks and balances that regulate how each branch exercise their powers. This 
relationship has made accountability an essential requirement.   
 
As Sahgal (2001:4) observed, “accountability is not optional in democracy as it is a “price 
paid in exchange for the power and delegation of authority”.  The legislature has the power 
to make the executive account for its actions.  The legislature it is believed has the ability to 
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illicit as well as enforces “responsible behaviour from government (Ahmed, 2000:16).  He 
goes further to state that accountability in general is likely to promote the main values of 
financial accountability such as honestly, productivity and fairness.    
 
In view of the above, it can be argued that the legislature has the right to represent the 
people in ensuring that the public financial resources are used effectively and efficiently.  
This argument is supported by Jibo (2000:3) who infer that the oversight function of the 
“financial behaviour” is monitored, supervised and controlled by the legislature.  The 
legislature has an important role to play in ensuring financial accountability.  In some 
countries, financial accountability is exercised as a deliberative function of the legislature 
whereby, it is a constitutional requirement for the legislature to approve appropriations and 
taxation in order to be lawful (Dobell & Ulrich, 2002:34).   
 
Thus, it will be correct to conclude that financial accountability is an essential part of the 
oversight function of the legislature. The concepts such as the ‘power of the purse and 
stewardship of public money” clearly highlight the power of the legislature to “the right to 
give prior approval to rising of finance through taxation, the right to approve the total and 
allocations of expenditure of public funds and the right to control the execution of the 
expenditure” (Dicey, 1960:447). Following on Dicey’s assertion, many legislatures in 
developed and developing countries play a role in financial accountability. Legislative 
financial accountability refers to supervision, ensuring accountability and oversight of the 
legislature over the utilisation of the public finances by the executive structures and the 
administration.   
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2.3 DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability has become a critical part of public governance. As a concept that originally 
emerged as an element of public finance management (i.e. “computing and giving account 
for the expenditure of public funds” (Redlynch, 2001:15). The concept of accountability now 
goes beyond the domain of public finance and applies to a wide array of important 
decisions and authorities that are responsible for making those decisions. At the centre of 
the concept of accountability is the checking and balancing of potential abuse of power by 
public officials with the objective of limiting the potential for corruption of public offices and 
officials.  
 
The domain of accountability has, however, expanded through time, from the proper 
exercising of power to include accountability for improving the efficiency and reducing 
waste in carrying out public programmes. It also expanded “to focus on the effectiveness of 
government in meeting publicly desired outcomes for programmes and operations” 
(Community Law Centre: 2008). 
 
 Griffith, (2005: 10) argues that accountability is acknowledged to be ‘a notoriously 
imprecise term. The relevant academic literature typically spends some time explaining 
both what it is and what it is not. As to what is, as good as starting point as any is the 
approach adopted in the 2001 Sharman Report which divides the notion of accountability 
into four aspects: 
? giving an explanation - through which the main stakeholders ( for example Council 
are advised about what is happening, perhaps through an annual report, outlined 
performance, and capacity; 
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? providing further information when required – where those accountable may be 
asked to account further, perhaps by providing information ( e.g. to a select 
committee) on performance, beyond accounts already given; 
? reviewing, and if necessary revising – where those accountable respond by 
examining performance, systems or practices, and if necessary, making changes to 
meet expectations; and 
? granting redress or imposing sanctions – if a mechanism to impose sanctions exists, 
stakeholders might enforce their rights on those accountable to effect changes. 
 
A similar definition is given by Ghutto (2007: 8) who state that accountability is a social 
relationship where an actor (an individual or any agency) feels an obligation to explain and 
justify his or her conduct to some significant other (the accountability form, accountee, 
specific person or agency). He argues further that accountability is the hallmark of modern 
democratic governance; democracy remains cliché if those in power cannot be held 
accountable in public for their acts or omissions, for their decisions, their expenditures or 
policies. Historically, the concept of accountability was closely linked to accounting in the 
financial sense. It has however moved far beyond its origins and has become a symbol of 
good governance both in public and private sector. 
 
 Ghutto (2007:8) further argues that accountability refers to institutionalised practices of 
giving account of how assigned responsibilities are carried out. 
From available literature, we can state that the functions of accountability include the 
following: 
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? to enhance the integrity of public governance in order to safeguard government 
against corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and other forms of inappropriate 
behavior; 
? as an institutional arrangement, to effect democratic control; 
? to improve performance which will foster institutional learning and service delivery; 
? in the sense of transparency, responsiveness, answerability, it is meant to assure 
public confidence in government and bridge the gap between the governed and 
government and ensure public confidence in government; and 
? to enable the public to judge the performance of the government by the 
government giving account in public.  
 
According to Dye and Stephenhurst, (1997:12) accountability is a process that subjects 
a form of control over departments and agencies, causing them to give a general 
accounting for their actions. “Etzioni, (1975: 279) is of the view that there are three 
meanings associated with the term accountability: 
a. greater responsibility to elected members 
b. greater responsiveness to community groups 
c. greater commitment to “values and higher standards of morality. 
 
We could therefore argue that accountability is a process whereby people entrusted with 
resources are required to give account of their stewardship to the relevant stakeholders 
and this may or may not be required by legislation. 
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Financial accountability is simply defined as the duty or liability to give account on financial 
matters.  Scott, (2000:40) state that accountability is “a liability to reveal, to explain, and to 
justify what one does; how one discharges responsibilities, financial or others, whose 
several origins may be political, constitutional, hierarchical or contractual”.  Along the same 
line, Rabrenovic (2009:30) defines financial accountability as “answerability or justification 
for one’s actions and behaviour”. 
 
Redlynch, (2001:15) also state that financial accountability is about “responsible 
stewardship for use of public money.” The issue of responsible stewardship for the use of 
public money answers the ‘for what’ dimension of accountability.  It furthermore clarifies the 
relationship issues embedded in the accountability relations between the council and the 
administration. 
 
According to Brinkerhoff, (2001:10) financial accountability concerns tracking and reporting 
on allocation, disbursement, utilization of financial resources, using tools of auditing, 
budgeting and accounting. He asserts that this dimension of accountability deals with 
compliance with laws, rules and regulations regarding financial control and management. 
 
Having identified fiscal transparency as a pillar in the achievement of good governance, 
Asselin (1995:3) writes that: 
“Financial accountability demands a properly functioning government accounting system for 
effective budgetary control and cash management; an external audit system which 
reinforces expenditure control by exposure and sanctions against misspending and 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
corruption, and mechanism to review and act on the results of audit and to ensure that 
follow-up action is taken to remedy problems identified.” 
He argues further that “Without a well-functioning system of financial accountability, 
government efficiency is poor, the probability of corruption increases greatly and the 
prospects of economic growth and development is impaired.” 
  
As Dwivedi & Jabbra (1989:5) conclude that “financial accountability in its core sense is a 
democratic accountability, as a relationship is established between the government and its 
citizens, where citizens, through direct or indirect means and institutions are holding the 
government to account for the stewardship of the public money. 
 
The above definitions highlight delegation as a fundamental issue.  It can be assumed that 
one is obligated to account due to delegation from another body.  Therefore, the body that 
delegates has the responsibility to ensure that duties or functions as delegated have been 
performed as intended.  In other words, the body or person who has been entrusted with 
delegated authority has the obligations to give account.   
 
In view of the above, Rabrenovic (2009:40) define the concept of financial accountability as 
“the means of ensuring that public money has been used in a responsible and productive 
way. It is about verification of legality and regularity of financial accounts, but also about 
making sure that the value for money has been achieved in the use of resources”.   
 
Understanding the concept of financial accountability requires clarity on terms such as 
public money, stewardship of public money, proper and productive use of public resources.  
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For example, Rabrenovic, (2009:40) state that public money is all the money raised by 
government in the form of taxes, fees and charges  borrowed by government.  Regarding 
stewardship of public money, Rabrenovic provides that it is an expectation and requirement 
that public money is spent in accordance with existing laws, regulations and principles.  In 
terms of the concept of value for money, Rabrenovic, (2009:41) state that the obligation 
rests with public bodies to make the best use of the resources.  
 
The executive structures play a dominant role in financial matters of government (Wehner, 
2003:29).  The dominant role in the financial matters is as the result of the expertise and 
information held by the administration. Similarly, being dominant in the formulation and 
implementing stages of the budget, gives the executive an advantage over the legislature.   
Following the above discussion, it is logical for the councils to establish internal 
mechanisms for financial accountability. The essence of internal mechanisms is the 
presence of a hierarchical line of accountability between the political executive, such as the 
councillors and officials. The councillors and the political executive are empowered to 
account on behalf of the municipality. Most countries have some systems of financial 
accountability which are intended on strengthening the control of the Treasury over 
spending departments Rabrenovic, (2009:67). In this arrangement, the Treasury is 
responsible for holding spending department accountable.     
 
Ahmed, (2000:8) argues that in most cases the existing internal mechanisms used to 
facilitate financial accountability are “defective”. According to him, there is a complete 
breakdown of internal control mechanisms as evidenced by a number of irregularities and 
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incidents of maladministration in public expenditure.  Ahmed (2000:9) goes further to state 
that internal financial accountability mechanisms are weak and that accounting officers 
have failed to take “ownership of the responsibility assigned by law”. To remedy weak 
internal mechanisms of financial accountability, Rabrenovic (2009:65) proposes a “strong 
interlink between the internal and external financial mechanisms such as those exercised 
by the legislature and Auditor-General.      
   
According to Rabrenovic, interlink between legislative and executive mechanism will bring 
about “about external political and public accountability as well as internal” managerial or 
administrative” accountability, which is useful in building trust and consensus among all key 
stakeholders. The distinction between political and administrative accountability is very 
useful in financial accountability. In a democracy, political accountability is exercised by the 
legislature on behalf of the people. Accordingly, the legislature as the elected body is 
mandated to hold government as the political executive structure accountable for use of 
public financial resources. On the other hand, administrative accountability is about the 
various control mechanisms internally within government departments. Both the internal 
and external mechanisms facilitate an effective complementarity relationship are critical to 
promoting effective financial accountability. This argument is supported by Rabrenovic 
(2009:44) statement that the financial accountability is a relationship between the 
government and the legislature in “securing and safeguarding public money”.      
 
According to Rabrenovic (2009:51) appropriate mechanism are necessary for the 
legislature to ensure that the executive behaves in accordance with the approved budget.  
Thus, the appropriate mechanisms assist in ensuring that legislatures are not marginalised, 
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that activities such as financial scrutiny is not ad-hoc but systematic and most 
fundamentally that the role of the legislature in exercising financial accountability become 
culture and not perceived as an unnecessary intrusion by the executive ( Martinez –
Soliman , 2003:5).   
 
There are various mechanisms available to legislature to use when exercising financial 
accountability. According Krafchik & Wehner (2002:2) mechanisms such as access to 
Information, Legislative budget Research, Legislative Committees, are some of the key 
mechanisms used by legislatures to exercise financial accountability. Cilliers, (1996:18) 
also note that financial accountability is the end result of a complex interrelated measures, 
laws, institutions and practices.  As a result the ability of the legislature to exercise effective 
financial accountability depend on “legal authority, ability and attitude” of the legislature.   
 
According to Ebo (2008:10) legal authority refers to the legal instruments available to 
empower the legislature to exercise financial accountability. These legal instruments can 
originate from the constitution and or from ordinary laws and regulations.  Ability on the 
other hand, refers to the capacity of the legislature to hold the executive accountable over 
the financial matters.  
  
Ebo (2008:10) identifies human, financial and technical resources as constituting the 
capacity of the legislature to exercise financial accountability. Lastly, attitude is regarded by 
Ebo (2008:10) as the “political drive” of the legislature for financial accountability.  Similarly, 
attitude relates to the will of the elected representative to truly exercise government 
departments accountable. To implement financial accountability, legislatures must establish 
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appropriate processes and mechanisms. One of the key internal mechanisms and 
processes available for legislature to exercise financial accountability is committees.  
“Committees can provide an effective means of underpinning the authority of the legislature 
against the executive” in terms of how public financial resources are utilised (Rockman, 
1984:415). 
 
2.4 LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES 
Legislatures of modern democracies are complex institutions entrusted with huge 
responsibilities.  The role of legislatures had grown substantially along that of government 
as a whole.  Mattsson & Strom agree that legislatures have become “large and unwielding 
bodies “with variety of functions and responsibilities (1995:24). The nature and the amount 
of work performed by the legislature in terms of analysing, deliberating, and approving 
volumes of documents can be daunting for legislators. 
 
Legislative committees are widely regarded as sub-groups or sub-division of the assembly 
or legislature. Wehner state that committees are small groups of legislators who are 
delegated, “on either a temporary or permanent basis” the responsibility to investigate 
issues in detail and propose policy changes (2009:29). Many of the activities of the 
legislature do not take place in the plenary Mattsson & Strom (1995:249). Accordingly, 
committees of the legislature are established to assist in transacting some of the business 
of the legislature.  Davidson & Olleszek argue that committees are the “means through 
which legislatures shift through an otherwise impossible jumble of bills, proposal and 
issues” (1996:53).   
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Legislative committees are established for a variety of reasons which include institutional 
tasks such as law making, budgeting and administrative accountability. In addition to 
institutional tasks, legislatures establish committees to attend to “household” issues” 
Mattson & Strom, (1995:257). Specifically, committees are established for legislative 
purpose, financial purpose, investigative purpose and housekeeping purpose. It can be 
argued that the existence of committees is recognition that the legislature is often ill-
prepared to engage in any meaningful detail its law-making, representation and oversight 
functions. Mattsson & Strom supports this argument when saying that legislative 
committees promote efficiency and productivity emanating from specialisation of 
committees and adequate time for committees to deliberate on issues (1995:249).     
 
The significance attached to legislative committees is reflected in how they are regarded 
globally. For example in South Africa legislative committee are referred to as engine rooms, 
while in other countries such as Bangladesh, they are depicted as “miniature legislatures or 
microcosms of their parent bodies” (Strom, 1998:96).  Equally, President Woodrow Wilson 
is quoted by Huitt as having described committees as “the very heart of law making 
process in the United States and that Congressional committee is Congress at work” 
(1954:340). The legislative committee is also recognised by Rabrenovic as a key financial 
instrument of the legislature to exercise financial accountability (2009:75). According to 
him, these committees are useful in examining the conformity of the executive to issues of 
“regularity, propriety and value for money”.   
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2.4.1 Factors Impacting on Legislative Committees  Effectiveness in Promoting 
Financial Accountability  
It has been highlighted that effective financial accountability by legislatures require the 
creation of appropriate mechanisms. However, the existence of these mechanisms does 
not necessarily guarantee effective financial accountability. It is important that these 
mechanisms must be complemented by other factors to promote a culture of governance 
that facilitates a conducive environment within which legislatures can promote 
accountability in general and financial accountability in particular. 
 
Ogul in Lees state, there are “opportunity factors that produce an oversight-maximising 
syndrome” 1977:196). According to Lees, factors like “legal authority, staff resources, 
committee structure, status of committee and cooperative relations with executive 
structures” have the ability to promote effective financial accountability. Similarly, in his 
articulation of the conceptual framework of legislative committees, Mahiuddin argues that 
the effectiveness of committees to perform their functions is dependent on the appropriate 
“political environment, committee structure and committee capacity” (2009:13).   
  
Political environment refers to issues such as the political situation, nature of political 
parties and society. The committee structure on the other hand speaks to the authority, 
types and the establishment processes of committees. Committee capacity entails 
technical, financial and human resources at the disposal of the committees to carry out its 
responsibilities. Following Ogul and Mahiuddin’s above propositions, the factors that impact 
on the effectiveness of the legislative committees can be summarised as their structure, 
powers and procedures. 
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  According to Mattson & Strom structures, procedures and powers of committees “impact 
the ways in which they foster or hinder the legislative effectiveness for financial 
accountability (1995:250).   
 
2.4.2 COMMITTEE STRUCTURE 
Different countries have established a variety and diverse committee.  Mattson & Strom 
state that divergence is in terms of their functions, size, composition and institutionalization 
(1995:250). Similarly, committees have different structural features influenced by legal and 
political dynamics of a country. Legislative committee structure is prescribed and influenced 
by formal statutory instruments and internal Rules of the legislature. Formal statutory 
instruments include the constitution and other laws and regulations. Internal Rules are the 
prescriptions developed by the legislature to manage the business of the legislature and its 
committees.   
 
The above view is supported by Mahiuddin when he state that the constitution, statutory 
regulation and the internal rules are the three key sources of committee organisation and 
their functioning (2009:22). Those that are established by the constitution are explicitly 
provided for by the provisions of the constitution. In certain instances the constitution will 
provide for the enactment of a law for the establishment of the committees.  Similarly, the 
constitution will also provide for the legislature to establish measures to manage its internal 
business.      
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Considering that legislative committees are established for various reasons, there are 
therefore, permanent or standing committees and ad hoc committees. Mattson &Strom 
(1995:250) describe standing committees as “having a fixed membership and jurisdiction 
over the entire legislative term”.  They also further identify ad hoc committees as having “no 
fix duration and generally dissolves after completion of their designated task”.   
 
Mattson & Strom list the following committees available in different countries:   
a) Ad hoc committee:  They consider a specific task; 
b) Permanent or standing committees:  They have an entrenched role in all legislative 
processes; and 
c) Joint committees:  A committee made up of members of both chapters of houses in 
a bicameral legislature. 
 
2.4.3 POWERS OF COMMITTEES 
In general, legislative committees are vested with powers to scrutinise proposed legislation 
as well as conducting accountability. According to Mahiuddin constitutionally established 
committees are generally accompanied by prescriptions on establishment as well as their 
jurisdiction (2009:22). He adds that the constitution prescribes for broad principles of issues 
such as “information acquisition”, the right to call members of the executive and the right to 
demand access to information.   
 
The power or authority of committees is defined by their respective parent legislatures.   In 
some instances, committees such as those dealing with financial matters are vested with 
the authority to “examine whether public money voted by the legislature has been spent in 
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accordance with the legislative intentions and with due regard to issues of regularity, 
propriety and value for money” (Schick, 1999:30). 
 
According to Wehner committees generally perform the following functions: 
I.  to advice the legislature  after undertaking an inquiry or after members negotiate 
with each other; 
II. to inquire and advice; and 
III. to scrutinise and control, seeing whether and how a process is being performed. 
 
2.4.4 COMMITTEES PROCEDURE 
According to Wehner the manner in which legislative committees perform their functions is 
greatly influenced and governed by the nature of the “institution of which they form part” 
(2009:29).  Accordingly, committees are expected to function in a non-partisan manner.  
Similarly, the effectiveness of the committees is dependent on how independent it is from 
the ruling majority party in the legislature.   
 
The independence and impartiality of the committees, especially finance committees such 
as the Public Accounts Committees is achieved through legal and traditional legislative 
practices. One such prescription is that the chairperson of the committee must be a 
member of the opposition party Rabrenovic, (2009:76). The committee, especially the 
Public Accounts Committee uses measure such as the Auditor-General’s report and other 
special reports to summon, investigate, and engage through a hearing the elected 
representatives and officials.  
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Similarly, the committee has the authority to make recommendation and may impose 
sanctions Rabrenovic, (2009:77).   
 
2.5 CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED BY LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES 
Friedberg in Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson & Trapp, identify the following as structural and 
procedural failures characterising legislative committees (2008:217): 
I. Lack of overlap between committees and departments.  Committees that cover a 
“wide variety of government activities is often unable to focus on, and gain in-depth 
expertise in, an area of a specific department”;  
II. The ability of factions to change committee members as desired.  On this issue, 
they argue that procedures allow parties to change their committee representation 
whenever they wish resulting in opportunities to silence members who express 
independent opinions.   Accordingly the removal of members’ impact negatively on 
the turnover of and consequently the committee is weakened; and    
III.  Lack of binding status for committee decisions.  Often committees lack the power 
to enforce their decisions or compel the department to implement their decisions.  
For example, in South Africa ministers have often failed to appear before the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts or other committees of the legislature 
Friedberg in Stapenhurst, Pelizzo, Olson & Trapp (2008:217). 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
2.6 REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES 
Legislative committees responsible for ensuring effective financial accountability must have 
a deliberate focus on and interest in exercising substantive scrutiny over the financial 
affairs of government departments. To ensure effective oversight, committee members 
must be familiar with the role and understanding the budget process and content.  Similarly, 
Rabrenovic suggests that members represented in committees must have the capacity to 
participate in the budget and finance hearings (2009:217). 
Rabrenovic proposes the following as requirements for legislative committees responsible 
for ensuring financial accountability: 
 
I. There is a need to for establishing a special legislative committee that deals solely 
with financial accountability.  According to Rabrenovic this will require changes of 
rules of procedure of the respective chamber; 
II.  The committee members must be “extensively trained to in order to obtain the 
knowledge necessary to provide support to the legislature in exercising financial 
accountability; 
The main aim of this committee should be to “enhance the oversight role by the 
legislature.  Specifically, the focus of the committee should be to exercise vigorous 
scrutiny of the public expenditure continuously during the financial year (Wehner, 
1955:3);     
III.   The committees should be composed in a manner that promotes equitable 
representation of political parties in the legislature.  However, an attempt must be 
made to minimise the political polarisation of the committees. Therefore, 
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constructive cooperation among members represented in the committee must be 
encouraged;  
IV. Rabrenovic is of the view that appointing a member of the opposition to chair the 
committee promotes robustness and independence of the committee (2009:218); 
and   
V. The committee must have the power to summon or call any person to testify before 
it.  Similarly, the committee must have the authority to access relevant information 
from any person or government institution.     
 
While the above are requirements of the committee dealing with financial accountability, it 
is still critical for all members of the legislature to have the necessary knowledge and 
information on financial accountability matters.  In addition, the legislature should inculcate 
a culture of governance that promotes accountability, transparency and non-partisan 
approach to issue of financial accountability.  
 
2.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Financial accountability is a fundamental requirement for legislature’s quest to promote 
good governance. Entrusted with the power to serve as custodians of public resources, 
legislature are developing and experimenting with various mechanisms to strengthen their 
efforts of ensuring that the spending of public money promotes stewardship and value for 
money. The key mechanism used by the legislature as evident in the literature review is 
legislative committees. Legislative committees, especially, finance or public accounts 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
committees are structures and vested with the necessary powers to ensure effective 
financial accountability.   
However, these committees must be assisted with the necessary capacity, information and 
legal authority to exercise their role and responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK PERTAINING 
TO THE STRUCTURES, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF COUNCIL 
COMMITTEES INVOLVED IN PROMOTING FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
An objective of this study was to highlight the legislative and policy framework governing 
municipal council committees. This objective is informed by the fact the ability of the council 
to promote effective financial accountability over the executive and administrative 
structures is contingent on the establishment of appropriate council committees with 
adequate authority and resources  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the South African legislative and policy framework 
governing council committees. It focuses on the legal and policy framework establishing 
and regulating the powers, functions and procedures of council committees responsible for 
financial accountability. 
 
Accordingly, this Chapter discusses the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the 
Municipal Structures Act, Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Finance Management 
Act.  In addition, the chapter explains the processes undertaken by municipal council to 
establish and empower council committees to exercise financial accountability.     
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3.2 CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
South Africa’s founding values as provided by Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996, entrench the principle of accountability. This constitutional provision 
obligates all organs of state to provide a system of governance that promotes 
accountability.  Enshrining accountability alongside other values such as “responsiveness 
and openness” the Section 1 of the Constitution elevates accountability as a basic 
requirement of an open democratic society. 
 
With regard to the establishment of council committees, the Constitution locates that as the 
responsibility of the municipal council internal procedures.  Specifically, Section 160 (1) of 
the Constitution vests the municipal council with the authority to “elect an executive 
committee and other committees subject to national legislation and may employ personnel 
that are necessary for the effective performance of its functions”. 
 
The above Constitutional provision on the establishment of council committees provides a 
much needed authority for these committees. The constitutionally establishment 
committees system is an indication of their significance and relevance in terms of 
transacting the business of the council effectively.  In addition, the legal status of the 
committees is a core mechanism through which the council exercises accountability is 
significantly enhanced. 
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3.3 MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES ACT OF 1998 (MSA) 
It must also be noted that the municipal council meetings do not often provide an adequate 
platform for detailed deliberation on issues. Due to stringent procedures governing the 
debate in the municipal council meetings, an in-depth discussion on issues tabled is 
insufficient to facilitate active and meaningful financial accountability for the executive and 
administrative structures. 
 
Therefore municipal council establishes institutional mechanism that would provide non-
executive councillors with spaces for in-depth deliberations on various issues impacting on 
their roles and responsibilities. For this purpose, the municipal council establish committees 
as provided for by Section 33 and Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998), 
to create opportunities for councillors to engage meaningfully with municipal governance 
and related issues. 
 
To give effect to Section 160 (1) of the Constitution, the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 
1998 provides for the establishment of various types of committees.  Section 33 of the 
Municipal Structures Act establishes the criteria of the establishment of committee.  In 
terms thereof the municipality “may establish a committee provided for in this act if  
• the municipality is of a type that is empowered in terms of this Act to establish a 
committee of the desired kind; 
• the establishment of the committee is necessary, taking into account 
• the extent of the functions and powers of the municipality; 
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• the need for the delegation of those functions and powers in order to ensure 
efficiency and effectiveness in their performance; 
•  the financial and administrative resources of the municipality available to support 
the proposed committee; and 
• In the case of the establishment of an executive committee, the municipality has 
more than nine councillors”   
 
In addition, Section 79 (1) (a) to (e) and (2) (a) to (f) of the Municipal Structures Act makes 
provision for the establishment of committees in the municipality including council 
committees.  According to this provision, the municipal council is vested with the authority 
to “establish one or more committees necessary for the effective and efficient performance 
of any of its functions or exercise of any of its powers and appoint the members of such 
committees from among its members (Section 79 (2) of the Municipal Structures Act (117 
of 1998).” Furthermore, Section 79 (2) of the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) 
prescribes that the municipal council: 
• “ Must determine the functions of a committee; 
• May delegate duties and powers of it in terms of section 59 of the Municipal 
Systems Act; 
• May authorise a committee to co-opt advisory members who are not members of 
the council within the limits determined by the council; 
• May remove a member of a committee at any time; and 
• May determine a committee’s procedure”. 
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As indicated, both Section 33 and Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act provide 
municipal council with adequate legal authority to shape the nature and content of the 
council committees. Consequently, municipal council can use Section 79 committees as 
one of the mechanisms to exercise financial accountability. 
 
Similarly, it can be argued that it would be impossible for the municipal council to exercise 
proper accountability over the executive and the administration by reviewing all 
performance aspects related to the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), Budget, 
Performance Management and Service Delivery during its plenary processes. Therefore, 
there is a need for the council to establish committees for specialised and focused attention 
on specific issues to ensure in-depth engagement with issues. Therefore, Section 33 and 
Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act present the municipal council with the necessary 
and an enabling governance environment to exercise accountability on all municipal 
functions.   
 
3.4 MUNICIPAL FINANCE MANAGEMENT ACT  
Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 (Act 56 of 2003) is the key legal authority 
regulating municipal finance and budgeting. The Municipal Finance Management Act is the 
cornerstone of municipal finance and it consist of four interrelated components, namely 
“planning and budgeting, revenue and expenditure, reporting and oversight” The Local 
Government Budget and Expenditure Review, (2008:157). In realising the accountability 
objectives of the Constitution and the Municipal Finance Management Act establish various 
mechanisms which include committees.  
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The Municipal Finance Management prescribes for the establishment of audit committees. 
Section 166 of the Municipal Finance Management Act provides for Audit Committee which 
must serve as an independent advisory structure to the municipal council. In terms of these 
provisions, each municipality must have an Audit Committee consisting of at least four 
persons and with the majority of members coming from outside the municipality. 
Councillors are not allowed to be members of the Audit Committee. 
 
Though the Audit Committee is a separate arrangement from that established in terms of 
Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act, it however, serves similar purpose of assisting 
the municipal council to exercise financial accountability over the executive and 
administrative structures. According to De Visser, Steytler & May (not dated: 14) the 
information generated by the Audit Committee is significant in enhancing the ability of the 
municipal council to promote financial accountability. 
 
Regarding its ability to facilitate council oversight over the officials, the Audit Committee is 
appointed by the council to provide an “objective review of the municipality’s finances” (De 
Visser, Steytler & May (not date: 14). Being a committee of council, the Audit Committee 
provides councillors with information that empowers them for meaningful interaction with 
the executive and administrative structures. The most important element emerging from the 
role of the Audit Committee is its significance in facilitating opportunities for the municipal 
council to access or receive relevant information. 
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Furthermore, by reporting to the council about the committee’s activities, issues, and 
related recommendations, the committees creates a practical avenue of communication 
between internal audit, the external auditors, and the municipal council. Thus, it can be 
argued that the Audit committee assists the councillors to exercise their financial oversight 
over the executive and administration. 
 
3.5 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 
An Oversight Committee is one of the council committees consisting only of non-executive 
councillors. The council may determine and delegate powers and functions to the Oversight 
Committee. As a committee of a municipal council, an Oversight Committees is established 
for the detailed analysis and review of the Annual Reports and the drafting of an oversight 
reports that may be taken to full council for discussion” (MFMA Circular No 32, 2006:17). 
An Annual Report is a requirement placed on all municipal entities as a key reporting 
instrument for municipalities to report against performance targets outlined in their strategic 
plans. The report allows the committee members the opportunity to determine if the pre-
determined budgetary plan has been implemented. 
 
The MFMA Circular No 32 (2006: 17) suggests that “at the same time that the Oversight 
Committee is analysing the report in detail, other councillors should also be conducting 
their own review of the report.’’ This entails councillors actively undertaking for the following 
activities: 
• Invite, receive and consider inputs from ward committees and other relevant 
stakeholders; 
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• Consider written comments received on the Annual Report from the pubic 
consultation process; 
• Conduct public hearing(s) to allow the local community or any organs of  the state to 
make representations on the Annual Report; and 
• Receive and consider Council’s Performance Audit Committee views and 
comments on the annual financial statements and the performance report. 
 
The above mentioned activities of the oversight committee would certainly facilitate active 
involvement of councillors in the process of scrutinizing Annual Report. Consequently, non-
executive councillor’s role would be significantly strengthened in ensuring performance 
from the Executive Mayor and Mayoral Committee. 
 
3.6 SERVICE DELIVERY AND BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
A Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) is provided for in terms of 
Section 69 (3) (a) & (b) of the Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of 2003). It is defined 
as a management, implementation and monitoring tool that provides in year information for 
all key stakeholders in municipal governance. In terms of the MFMA Circular No 13 
(2005:2), the SDBIP is submitted for final approval by the Mayoral /Executive Mayor within 
14 days of the approval of the budget and it is used to “monitor the execution of the budget, 
performance of Senior Management and the achievement of strategic objectives set out by 
Council”. 
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The SDBIP makes the following information available: 
• Monthly Projections of Revenue to be Collected for each Source; 
• Monthly Projections of Expenditure and Revenue for each Vote; 
• Quarterly Projections of Service Delivery Targets and Performance Indicators; for each 
Vote; and 
• Detailed Capital Budget Broken Down by Ward over 3 years. 
 
The above components should produce comprehensive information that would be strategic 
for councillors to exercise effective oversight over the administration. As indicated by De 
Visser the SDBIP is a hands-on implementation plan that the council can hold the executive 
and administration accountable for”. The SDBIP makes available information on the output 
and goals that will be used   to measure performance on a quality basis during the financial 
year (MFMA Circular No. 13, 2005: 4). Accordingly, the SDBIP serves a critical role to 
focus the council on outputs by providing clarity of Service Delivery Expectations, 
Expenditure and Revenue Requirements, Service Delivery targets and performance 
indicators. 
 
3.7 MUNICIPAL PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEES 
The establishment of Municipal Public Accounts Committees (MPAC) is a recent practice 
adopted by some municipalities to strengthen their municipal council’s oversight duties over 
the executive and administration. In the case of the City of Johannesburg, the MPAC is 
mandated to investigate any cases of alleged fraudulent activities, corruption and 
mismanagement, and is empowered to access any information required for these 
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investigations (www.joburg.org.za). Similarly, the City of Cape Town has established the 
Municipal Standing Committee on Public Accounts (MSCOPA) to “review the Auditor-
General’s Annual Report and also when instructed by the council or on its own initiative, to 
investigate and advise Council in respect of unauthorised, irregular or fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure” ( City of Cape, 2008:122). As in the case of the City of Johannesburg, the 
SCOPA in the City of Cape Town has been delegated the power to access: 
a) “All accounts and financial statements of the municipality; 
b) All reports of the Auditor-General; 
c) Information in respect of any disciplinary action taken in terms of the MFMA; 
d) Information in respect of transgressions in terms of MFAM 
 
The Public Accounts Committee for municipalities is a recent development. However, it is 
envisaged that it will critically question, summon officials and the executive and produce 
information that the council could use to exercise accountability 
 
3.8 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLS USED BY COUNCIL COMMITTEES 
Municipal council committees are endowed with various tools to exercise their financial 
accountability.  Some of the tools are established through legal measures whilst others are 
institutional constructions of municipalities’ Rules of Order. Some of the key instruments 
include the Annual Reports and Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan. 
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3.9 ANNUAL REPORT 
Section 121 (1) of the Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of 2003) instructs every 
municipality and municipal entity to prepare an Annual Report of each financial year. The 
Annual Report is a “backward looking report consisting of financial and non-financial 
information about the municipality that must be table in the municipal council by 31 
January” (MFMA Circular No 11, 2005:1). De Visser et al. (-16), identify the recording of 
activities and performance of the previous financial year as the main purpose of the Annual 
Report. The Annual Report promotes the “ municipality’s accountability for decision made  
during  the year to the local community and further highlight the following issues that must 
be included in the report: 
• The annual performance report; 
• The financial statements as submitted to the Auditor-General; 
• The Auditor-General’s report on the results of the performance measurement and 
financial statement; 
• If required, details of the corrective action taken or planned by relevant municipality 
in response to the report; 
• An assessing of arrears of municipal taxes and service charges and whether the 
revenue raising objectives set in the budget have been met; and 
• The recommendations of the Audit Committee. 
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When presenting the Annual Report to Council, the Mayor is required to report on all 
relevant “aspects of performance providing a true, honest and accurate account of the 
goals set by the council and success or otherwise in achieving these goals” (MFMA 
Circular No 11, 2005:1). Thus, De Visser concludes that the Annual Report is an extensive 
scrutiny that would enable the council to produce its oversight report. 
 
3.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Council and its committees are prescribed in the Constitution and statutes. The 
Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal Finance Management give effect to the 
Constitutional provisions on the establishment, authority and roles and functions of the 
council committees. The legislative framework of the council committees is a significant 
development which empowers the Council to manage its internal business including 
financial accountability. Similarly, it gives the council committees the necessary legal 
authority. The anchoring of the council committees within the legislative framework 
removes the arbitrariness regarding this establishment, powers and functions. This is 
important in terms of creating uniformity and standards for financial accountability in 
municipalities.     
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces and justifies the suitability of the qualitative approach to answer the 
research question posed. The chapter further discusses the process of data collection as 
well as its related analysis, reliability, objectivity and validity. The chapter ends by 
highlighting the ethical consideration and the limitation of the research. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN  
Barbie and Mouton see research design as a plan or blue print of how the researcher 
intends to conduct the research (2001:74-75). The focus is mainly on the end-product in 
identifying the points of departure and the logic of the research. However it is essential to 
describe research design clearly, and to motivate one’s choice regarding research design 
by referring to the relevant literature. Generally, research is described as “finding a way to a 
better understanding and explanation through literature and empirical study” (Henning, 
Gravett and Van Rensberg (2005: xvi). Similarly, research is also described as a “voyage of 
discovery” intended to unearth new knowledge or contribute to already existing body of 
knowledge (Remenyi: 1996:24).     
 
Like any process of discovery, a research requires a design to provide a plan of how to 
among other things, obtain relevant information (Welman & Kruger, 2001:46).  Accordingly, 
the study was conducted through the use of a case study design complemented by a 
qualitative approach.   
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The choice of the research design was influenced by its ability to foster an “understanding 
rather than predict, to interpret rather than manipulate the phenomena being studies”.  (Yin, 
1981:56). This research requires scientific methods to ensure that its validity and 
acceptability is beyond reproach. Consequently, the qualitative approach was deemed 
suitable.   
 
4.2.1 QUALITATIVE METHOD 
A qualitative approach was used to assess the role of council committees in promoting 
financial accountability. The qualitative approach was considered relevant in by its ability to 
undertake the study due to its ability to facilitate flexible, rigorous exploration and 
engagement with phenomena as they “unfold in real-world situations” (Durrheim, 1999:43). 
The approach was considered appropriate to solicit the views of the various council 
committees’ members regarding their understanding of the role of council committees in 
financial accountability (Clarke and Proctor, 1999:39). The qualitative approach, as used in 
this study, is an effective way of providing a set of preliminary findings in an emerging area 
of investigation with few empirical precedents (Yin, 1994:39). 
 
Neuman state that qualitative researchers emphasize the human factor and their intimate 
first-hand knowledge of the research setting, avoiding distancing themselves from people 
or events that they study (2000:126). This however does not mean arbitrarily interjecting 
personal opinion, being sloppy about data collection, or using evidence selectively to 
support personal prejudices, but taking advantage of personal insight, feelings and human 
perspectives to understand life more fully.  
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Furthermore, Neuman stipulates that qualitative researchers do not stop once there is an 
understanding of the significance of the action, but they go further to generalize and hence 
move to a broader level of interpretation, where a researcher assigns general theoretical 
significance (2000:148). 
 
4.2.2 CASE STUDY  
A case study was used to bring clarity and understanding of the role of the council 
committees. The rationale for this approached was informed by the work of Creswell, Yin 
and others (1994:12). According to Creswell, a case study is an example of qualitative 
research in which the researcher “explores a single entity or phenomenon (‘the case) 
bounded by time and activity (a programme, event, process, institution, or social group) and 
collects detailed information by using a variety of data collection procedures during a 
sustained period of time” (1994:12). 
Similarly, Yin provides that a case study is the collection and presentation of detailed 
information about a particular participant or small group, frequently including the accounts 
of subjects themselves (1994:14).  Yin goes further to state that when the goal of the study 
is to “understand rather than to predict, to interpret rather than to manipulate the 
phenomena under review”, then a case study as a research strategy is the most 
appropriate (1981:56). The appropriateness of using a case study was also influenced by 
the intention to understand the perceptions of council committees to promote effective 
financial accountability. This concern is informed by an understanding that the municipal 
council has the legal authority to promote financial accountability.   
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As this study is intended to assess issues related to the functioning of council committees, 
a case study is considered relevant in “studies that focus on the understanding of areas” 
that are not well documented Bryman, (1995:123). Accordingly, a field research case study 
in Stellenbosch Municipality will enable an “examination of a real world scenario” Yin 
(2000:40). 
 
According to Yin a case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the study 
is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the behaviour of those 
involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe they 
are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between 
the phenomenon and context (2003:13). The aforementioned underscores the 
appropriateness of using a case study to guide the research. 
 
4.2.3 SAMPLING METHOD 
According to Babbie and Mouton a sample means “a special subset of a population 
observed in order to make inferences about the nature of the population (2001:203). 
Similarly Kitcin and Tate, (2000: 54) and Arkarva and Lane, (1983:27), state that a sample 
is studied in an effort to understand the population from which it was drawn. As a result, the 
candidates for the interviews were selected from a list of councillors who served on two 
committees namely; Oversight Committee, and Audit Committee of Stellenbosch Local 
Municipality. This method of selecting the respondents was used mainly for convenience as 
councillors were busy campaigning for the local government elections of 18 May 2011. The 
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respondents consisted of the following ten participants, see table 1. There are ten members 
serving on the Oversight Committee and four members on the Audit Committee. 
Table 1 
COMMITTEES PARTY REPRESENTATION   
Audit Committee 
 
Independent  (2) 
 
 
Oversight Committee 
 
Democratic Alliance ( 3)  
African National Congress (2) 
Kayamnandi Community Alliance (1) 
United Democratic Movement ( 1) 
African Christian Democratic Party (1) 
 
Source: Own Source. 
 
4.2.4 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
  Multiple data collection methods were used to gather information. Mouton provides that 
data collected within the qualitative paradigm can be used to obtain details of subjective 
experiences (2003:32). Therefore, this qualitative approach enabled the researcher to 
focus on the subjective experiences, opinions and feelings of individual councillors 
represented in council committees. Furthermore, the qualitative approach enabled a 
comprehensive understanding from the councillors’ perspective of their role in promoting 
financial accountability, thereby ensuring that issues were explored appropriately. Within 
this objective, the study conducted face-to–face, semi-structured interviews, while other 
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councillors decided to complete the questionnaire. The semi-structured interviews were 
deemed relevant due to their potential to encourage councillors to freely articulate their 
experiences regarding the financial accountability processes. As indicated, the interviews 
were held with councillors from the Stellenbosch Municipality. Interviews were managed in 
a manner that promoted “iterative and continuous flexibility”, as advised by Rubin & Rubin 
(1995:46). Furthermore, an environment of trust was created that enabled the researcher to 
listen and ask probing questions to unearth relevant information. The researcher took notes 
during the interviews, which were typed up immediately after the interviews. The reason for 
not using audio-recording was as a result of a direct request by all interviewees to 
guarantee their privacy due to highly volatile political environment characterising the 
Western Cape.  
 
4.2.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
On completion of each interview, the main issues were summarised. All interviews were 
analysed using a descriptive approach as proposed by Tesch (1990:142-144). This 
approach consists of various steps that the researcher can use to reduce data into themes. 
In this study, the themes were constructed according to the relative importance of the 
factors mentioned during the interviews. Specifically, the issues that were mentioned 
frequently during the interviews and the level of qualitative emphasis articulated on each 
factor influenced the construction of themes.  In addition, themes were also linked to the 
factors that were mentioned in the literature review. 
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4.2.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY  
Babbie and Mouton (2006:24), argues that social researches should look both to their 
colleagues and to their subjects as sources of agreement on the most useful meanings and 
measurements of the concept they study. Sometimes one source will be more useful; 
sometimes the other, but neither should be dismissed. Therefore the researcher made a 
conscious effort to ensure that this study was conducted in a manner that promoted 
reliability and validity.  
 
The validity of the study was enriched by linking the findings with the literature, as well as 
maintaining alignment between the research question, the analyses and the conclusions. 
Similarly, the data collection and processing took into consideration the request to keep the 
interview candidates anonymous. The validity, reliability and the objectivity of the study was 
enhance by using triangulation.  Data was collected from primary and secondary sources, 
compare, contrast and subsequently informing the findings and recommendations made. 
 
4.2.7 ETHICAL STATEMENT  
Fetterman (1989:129), state some underlying ethical principles that need consideration in 
research are permission, honesty, trust, anonymity, reciprocity, and rigorous work. Firstly, 
the researcher obtained a letter from the supervisor Dr. Davids that granted her permission 
to conduct interviews with the concerned respondents from Stellenbosch municipality. 
Secondly, an introductory letter addressed to Stellenbosch Municipality requesting 
permission to conduct this research was also presented. 
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 Lastly permission was obtained from the various interviewees before interviews were 
conducted. Through the above undertakings, the researcher is committed and guided by 
the ethics code of conduct, as prescribed and agreed to by the University’s research 
committees. The code of conduct is listed below: 
• Obtain the consent of the participants before research is undertaken; 
• Ensure that the well-being of the participants takes precedence over the expected 
benefits to knowledge; 
• Inform participants of their right of refusal and of the degree of confidentiality with 
which the material that they provide will be handled; 
• Ensure that the participants have the right to remain anonymous and to have their 
rights to privacy and confidentiality respected, permitting no release of information 
about individual persons that has been guaranteed as confidential, to any person 
inside or outside the institution; 
• Approach the project with an unbiased attitude and strive to gather evidence fairly 
and accurately, and 
• Acknowledgement of all the sources of data used and quotations in the report in 
order to verify that the work meets all appropriate standard and expectations.   
 
4.2.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The data collection for the study experienced some limitations. Specifically, the sample 
used was very limited. As indicated earlier, the timing of the data collection took place on 
the eve of the Local Government Elections and most councillors were unavailable. 
Similarly, the other councillors who completed the questionnaire on their own made it 
impossible for the anticipated quality interaction with the researcher.    
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4.3   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter discussed the methodology and the related data collection techniques. A 
detailed explanation and justification for the methodology, case study, data collection and 
analyses have been outlined.  
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY OF STELLENBOSCH MUNICIPALITY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter outlines the governance and finance management role of Stellenbosch 
Municipality.  It provides the governance practices and challenges between 2006 and 2011.  
The Chapter also discusses the council committee’s establishment in terms of Section 79 
of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. The establishment of these committees is 
informed by and complied with the policy and legislative frameworks discussed in Chapter 
3 of this study.    
 
The Chapter highlights the mechanisms in place in the municipal council of Stellenbosch 
Municipality to promote effective financial accountability.  Particularly, the Chapter focuses 
on the two finance related committees, namely the Audit Committee and the Oversight 
Committee.   
 
The Chapter provides a description of the field work conducted with respondents from the 
Oversight and Audit committees.  The qualitative nature of the interviews focused on the 
opinions, knowledge, views of the members of the respective committees on the 
establishment, authority, procedures, capacity and attitudes of the members of these 
committees concerning issues that impact on their effectiveness.      
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5.2 BACKGROUND 
Stellenbosch Municipality is a category B municipality established in terms of Section 9 and 
16 of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998.  It is one of the constituent municipalities of the 
Cape Winelands District Municipality.  The Stellenbosch Municipality, as presently 
demarcated, consists of 19 wards spread across the following areas:  Stellenbosch town, 
Kayamandi, Klapmuts, Cloetesville, Idas Valley and Jamestown; Franschoek town, De 
Novo, Vlottenburg, Lynedoch, Raithby, Jamestown, Johannesdal, Kylemore, Phiel 
Lanquedoc, Wemmershoek, La Motte and Maarsdorp. 
 
The Stellenbosch Municipality is home to approximately 200527 people (IDP, 2010). The 
Coloured population group constitute 54% of the total population of the municipality while 
the other race groups, namely; African, White and Asian accounting collectively for the 46% 
of the municipality’s total population (Stellenbosch Municipality Annual Report, 
2007/2008:3). According to the socio-economic profile published by the Western Cape 
Provincial Government, Stellenbosch Municipality’s regional gross domestic product 
(GDPR) reached 3.9 billion in 2004, measured at constant 2000 prices. (Stellenbosch 
Municipality Annual Report, 2011/12). 
 
The 2001 unemployment rate was 17.1%. Most unemployed are Black youths aged 
between 15 and 24 years not yet completed secondary school, consisting of fewer women 
than men. Monthly individual per capita income shows that Black and Coloured population 
receives less income than other groups.  The manufacturing sector employed the largest 
proportion of all workers followed by the wholesale and retail sector.  
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Manufacturing is regarded as the most significant resource which is linked to the 
agricultural activities of the region (Stellenbosch Municipality IDP 2010). The municipality 
has a diverse revenue source generated mainly from electricity sales, property rates and 
municipal services. Its revenue and other transfers from National and Provincial 
Government contribute to the municipality’s R856 million Operational Annual Budget 
(Stellenbosch Municipality: Budget 2011/12).     
    
5.3 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF STELLENBOSCH MUNICIPALITY 
In terms of the “Stellenbosch Municipality fourth establishment Amendment Notice as 
published in the Western Cape Provincial Gazette Extraordinary No. 6137 dated 8 June 
2004” the Stellenbosch Municipality has 37 councillors. Of these nineteen (19) are ward 
councillors and eighteen (18) are proportionally elected councillors. Stellenbosch 
Municipality is a category B municipality with a mayoral executive system.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
According to the Stellenbosch Municipality’s Annual Report 2009/10, party representation 
in the municipal council is as follows:   
 
Table 2: Municipal Council Party Representation 
Political Party No. of Councillors 
African National Congress 17 
Democratic Alliance 14 
African Christian Democratic Party 2 
Independent 1 
Independent Democrats 1 
Kayamandi Community Association 1 
United Democratic Movement 1 
Total 37 
Source: Stellenbosch Municipality Annual Report 2009/10 
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5.3 .1 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
The municipal council of Stellenbosch Municipality is the primary structure with the Mayoral 
Executive system of the municipality. The municipal council is the legitimate representative 
of the citizens of Stellenbosch Municipality and has legislative and executive powers. The 
legislative powers of the Stellenbosch municipality are vested in the council (Section 151 of 
the Constitution of the RSA, 1996). In terms of this provision, the Municipal Council has the 
Constitutional Authority to pass by laws as well as ensure that they are implemented in 
accordance with the Councils’ intent.   
 
Therefore, Councillors in Stellenbosch Municipality have a critical role to play to ensure that 
the Executive Mayor, Mayoral Committee and the Municipal Administration adhere to the 
agenda set by the Council through the approved Integrated Development Plans (IDP), 
Budget and other Council resolutions in general. The Stellenbosch Municipality has through 
its Rules of Order, adopted various mechanisms to enable it to exercise its functions and 
responsibilities effectively (Stellenbosch Municipality Rules of Order, 2006:29). For purpose 
of financial oversight to ensure accountability, the Municipal Council has established the 
Oversight Committee, Steering Committee and Audit Committee to fulfill this role. These 
committees are an extension of and report to the municipal council.  
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5.3.2 EXECUTIVE STRUCTURES  
Stellenbosch local Municipality has an Executive Mayor elected by the Municipal Council in 
terms of Section 55 of the Structures Act 1998.  The Executive Mayor has the executive 
power to appoint the Mayoral Committee.  The Mayoral Committee is established mainly to 
assist the executive mayor in executing the executive powers. Members of the Mayoral 
Committees serve as the political executive of municipal portfolios.   
 
During the 2009/10 financial year, Stellenbosch Municipality was governed through a multi-
party coalition led by the Democratic Alliance (Annual Report, 2009/10). The council 
elected a political representative of the Democratic Alliance as the Executive Mayor of the 
Municipality. The executive mayor subsequently appointed the Mayoral Committee 
members. The members of the Mayoral Committee were drawn from Independent 
Democrats, African Christian Democratic Party, African National Congress, Independent, 
United Democratic Party, Kayamnandi Community Alliance, and the Democratic Alliance.   
 
The Executive Mayor and the Mayoral Committee of Stellenbosch Municipality functioned 
as the executive arm of the municipality. They do not derive their executive functions from 
the Constitution as these are vested in the municipal council which in turn delegated it to 
the Executive Mayor.  The Executive Mayor is charged with the responsibility to coordinate 
the budget process (Chapter 7 of Municipal Finance Management Act, No. 56 of 2003).  
Other executive functions are delegated to the various executive structures by the 
municipal council using the provisions of the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 and the 
Municipal Council Rules of Order.    
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5.4 GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES  
The governance of the Stellenbosch Municipality can be referred to as being unstable.  
During the period between 2006 and 2010, Stellenbosch Municipality was characterised by 
a high degree of political instability. The political instability was a result of lack of an outright 
single party majority to form a government. Consequently, this led to the formation of shaky 
coalitions between a number of political parties and independents that changed annually 
between 2006 to 2010.          
 
A survey of the municipal Annual Report from 2006/07 to 2009/10 indicates that the 
Municipality has experienced constant regime change with the executive structure, 
especially the Executive Mayor and the Mayoral Committee being changed regularly.  
These Annual Reports indicate that the African National Congress and the Democratic 
Alliance have both been the leading parties in the Stellenbosch Municipality’s Coalition 
government. With regard to finance management matters, Stellenbosch Municipality has 
managed to satisfy most of the finance management requirements.  This view is reflected 
in the consecutive unqualified findings audit outcomes received by Stellenbosch 
Municipality for the 2008/09 and 2009/10 financial years.  According to the Western Cape 
MFMA of 2009/10 Stellenbosch Municipality is one of the 21 municipalities in the Western 
Cape which received an “unqualified with findings” audit opinion from the Auditor-General.  
An unqualified audit opinion refers to a clean audit.  On the other hand, an unqualified audit 
with findings indicates that in general the municipality complied with relevant legislation but 
there are some minor problems.   
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In terms of the above discussion, it can be argued that the audit outcomes received by the 
Stellenbosch Municipality indicate the lack of effective measures for budget accountability  
Equally, the fact that audit outcome is recurring, is also an evidence of the inability to 
completely comply with laws and regulations.   
 
5.5 COUNCIL COMMITTEES PROMOTING FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
THE STELLENBOSCH MUNICIPALITY  
The municipal council of Stellenbosch Municipality has established two committees to 
assist it to exercise financial accountability. Specifically, two council committees, namely; 
Audit and Oversight Committee were established to assist the municipal council in 
exercising financial oversight between the period of 2006 to 2010. 
  
5.5.1 AUDIT COMMITTEE    
An Audit Committee is one of the finance related committees established to provide the 
municipal council with the necessary specialised support to exercise financial 
accountability.  Unlike the other council committees which are not compulsory, the Audit 
Committee is a statutory requirement in terms of Section 166 (1) of the MFMA. The 
Stellenbosch Municipality established Audit Committee in terms of the act comprises of four 
members. The members are independent professionals recruited from outside the 
municipality.            
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
The Audit Committee is appointed by the municipal council.  Political representatives are 
excluded from the Audit Committee.  The committee is structured in a manner that would 
enable it to be an independent advisory body to the municipal council.  In addition, the 
committee provides the municipal council with finance management information from an 
external perspective.  Consequently, the Audit Committee provides the councillors and the 
council in general with the relevant information to utilise in their exercise of financial 
oversight function. 
Some of the functions of the Audit Committee include: 
I. Advice the municipality and its constituent structures on all financial matters; 
II. Review the annual statement in order to provide the municipal council with an 
authoritative, informed and credible advice on the financial position of the 
municipality; 
III. Provide the municipal council with information regarding the compliance with the 
laws such as Municipal Finance Management Act, the Division of Revenue Act and 
other applicable regulations; and 
IV. Assist the council to respond to issues raised by the Auditor-General as well 
conduct financial investigations as and when requested by the municipal council.     
   
5.5.2 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE: 
The Municipal Council established an Oversight Committee as provided for by Section 79 
of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. Unlike the Audit Committee which is 
established in terms of statutory requirement, the Oversight Committee is established in 
terms of the Rules of Order.  
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The Oversight Committee was established in terms of Stellenbosch Municipality’s Part 12 
of the Rules of Order of 2006 which provides for the “establishment, composition 
procedures, powers and functions of committee”.  Non-executive councillors serve on the 
Oversight Committee. It is not clear whether the Council has delegated powers to the 
Oversight Committee. However, the councillors interviewed indicated that Municipal 
Council expects the Oversight Committees to consider the Annual Report.   
 
The Annual Report is a requirement placed on all municipalities and municipal entities as a 
key reporting instrument for municipalities to report against performance targets outlined in 
their strategic plans (Section 71 of the Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003).  In 
considering the Annual Report, the Oversight Committee must exercise a detailed analysis 
and review produce the Oversight Report.   This Oversight Report is presented, discussed 
and adopted by the full Council.  What was very clear is that the Oversight Committee is 
only active after the end of the financial year.  The role of the Oversight Committee is only 
visible during the Annual Report processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
 
5.6 ESTABLISHMENT  
The establishment process of both the Audit and Oversight Committee is required to satisfy 
the legal requirement as prescribed by the Municipal Structure Act, 117 of 1998, the 
Municipal System Act, 32 of 2000 and the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.  
The fundamental aspect of the legal requirements is that these committees must be such 
that it enhances the ability of the Municipal Council to exercise effective financial 
accountability.  As indicated in Chapter two, the nature of the establishment is critical to the 
image and functioning of the committee. As Ahmed suggests, there is a relationship 
between the strength of the committee and the manner in which it was established 
(2000:30).       
 
5.6.1 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE:  The majority of the Oversight Committee members 
interviewed indicated that the process of establishing the committee was representative of 
parties in council and operated in a manner that promotes openness. There was a high 
degree of consensus among the respondents, with the majority highlighting multiparty 
representation on the Oversight Committee as an important requirement when establishing 
the Oversight Committee.  Few of the members were of the opinion that the process was 
driven by the dominant political party and that smaller parties were ignored. It was also 
highlighted by the majority of the interviewed members that the Oversight Committee was 
made up of non-executive councilors.   This was raised as an important requirement for the 
establishment of the Oversight Committee.  However, when asked about the impact of the 
constant changes of the executive structures, caused by the regular changes in the 
coalition governments on the composition, the respondents were of the view that changes 
in the coalition partners’ impacted negatively or positively on the composition of the 
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committee. Some members of the Mayoral Committee could be relegated to Non-Executive 
Councilors after the new coalition was formed.  
       
5.6.2 AUDIT COMMITTEE:  The majority of the Audit Committee members interviewed 
believed that their establishment was in accordance with the requirements of Section 166 
(1) of the Municipal Financial Management Act 56 of 2003. They indicated that the 
establishment process was never questioned and therefore their legitimacy was beyond 
reproach.  Asked if the process was transparent and inclusive, the interviewees remarked 
that they believed that the process of establishing the Audit Committee was in accordance 
with the relevant legal requirements.  The Audit Committee unlike the Oversight Committee 
was not directly affected by the change in the political leadership.  In the main this is 
contributed to the fact that the members are appointed based on their professional ability 
and not on party political affiliation.   
 
5.7 THE AUTHORITY  
Chapter 2 highlighted the significance of the nature and scope of authority vested in 
committees.  It was indicated that the authority given to committee is the major determining 
factor on whether it will be able to exercise financial accountability. Whether prescribed by 
legislation or council’s Rules of Order, the committee must be able to advice, inquire, and 
scrutinise the financial matters of the municipality.   
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5.7.1 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE: The majority of the members interviewed felt that the 
power to consider the Annual Report is sufficient to exercise its mandate. When probed 
further about the adequacy of the authority in enabling the Committee to assist the council 
to exercise financial oversight, only few members indicated that the authority of the 
Oversight Committee is significant in promoting effective financial accountability.  All the 
interviewees indicated that they were not sure if they have the powers to call individuals 
within the executive and administrative structures to appear before the Oversight 
Committee.  Equally, all the interviewees were not aware of any delegated authority that 
could make the committee effective.  
 
5.7.2 AUDIT COMMITTEE: The general consensus was that the Committee had adequate 
authority to advise, inquire, and scrutinize the financial matters of the municipality.  
According to them, the authority to access the financial records and other relevant 
information of the municipality, as well as the direct access to the municipal council is 
empowering and essential to the function of the Committee.  They raised some reservation 
on their ability to effectively exercise their mandate.  
 
5.8 PROCEDURES  
It was indicated in Chapter 2 that the committee’s procedure is important in influencing its 
effectiveness.  One of the fundamental elements of the committees’ procedure is the ability 
to act in a non- partisan manner.    
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5.8.1 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE:  The members initially express the view that the 
committee achieves consensus on decisions and that the committee worked well together 
despite diverse political representation.  But follow up questions revealed that this is not 
necessarily the case. This is due to different political agendas’ that the committee members 
pursue.  When asked whether the procedures used by the committee are effective in 
enabling them to conduct oversight on all the stages of the budget to allow an informed 
decision only few members agree. The interviewees further indicated that their ability to 
force the executive to adopt their recommendations is limited.        
 
5.8.2 AUDIT COMMITTEE:  Respondents indicated that they transacted their tasks and 
functions in a non-partisan manner.  Being individuals drawn from various institutions and 
not political parties, the nature of financial advice that they offered to the council was the 
only important contribution.  However, members indicated that the council was not taking its 
recommendations seriously.  Furthermore, the financial statements are only sent to them 
after actual transactions had taken place and therefore limited the room for corrective 
action to take place.      
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5.9 CAPACITY  
Issues of capacity include technical ability and resources made available for committees to 
exercise financial accountability.  Accordingly, council committees tasked with exercising 
financial accountability must have the necessary capacity.  
      
 
5.9.1 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE:  The majority of the members interviewed indicated that 
there were capacity challenges within the committee.  The major challenges were financial 
and accounting skills. They indicated that they were not trained on how to read budget 
information and analyse financial statements. The absence of this important skill directly 
impacts on their ability of ensuring financial accountability. The majority of the members 
indicated that the committee lacks the technical ability to formulate relevant and adequately 
analysed financial questions to ask the executive and administrative structures. The 
members interviewed indicated that they do not have time to critically engage with the 
Annual Report of the municipality to make informed recommendations to the council.       
 
5.9.2 AUDIT COMMITTEE:  The respondents indicated that all members of the Audit 
Committee have the necessary skills and competencies to perform the required functions. 
One respondent indicated that the committee members have skills in reading the budget 
document, financial statements and reports.  The interviewees indicated that they were 
chosen based on their expertise to execute their auditing responsibility.  
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5.10 ATTITUDES OF COUNCIL COMMITTEES IN PROMOTING THEIR 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Another major factor influencing the effectiveness of the committees to exercise financial 
oversight is the willingness of their members to meaningfully engage the executive and 
officials.    
 
5.10.1 OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE:  The majority of the members interviewed indicated that 
some members were reluctant in criticising the executive and the administration attributed 
this reluctance to party political affiliation. The committee members of the ruling political 
party tend to take a soft approach to the executive and seldomly express a negative view.   
The opposite is similarly stated about those committee members from the opposition 
parties. They indicated that the constant changes in the position and the executive has 
impacted negatively on the Oversight Committee to clearly define its accountability 
relationship with the executive.     
 
5.10.2 AUDIT COMMITTEE:   The Audit Committee members indicated during the interview 
that political instability has impacted on the willingness of the committee to perform its 
accountability function. The council does not seem to value the recommendations of the 
Audit Committee. This inevitably affected the energy and commitment of the Audit 
Committee. 
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5.11 GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT 
 Santiso & Belgrano state that effective financial accountability takes place in legislature 
where there is a culture of accountability, transparency and openness (2004:24). This 
culture is critical as it enhances the legislature and its constituent structures to exercise 
effective financial accountability. All the respondents indicated that Stellenbosch 
Municipality’s governance environment has been seriously challenged by the regular 
changes to the executive structures. This resulted in animosity and strained working 
relations between the Council and the various political parties constituting the executive 
structures.  The animosity impacted on the relationship between the various parties in the 
Council and the Executive Structure resulting in accountability being compromised.  
    
5.12 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Stellenbosch Municipality is in general terms complying with the legislative requirement for 
establishing committees to assist the council to exercise financial accountability. 
Notwithstanding, a considerable amount of valuable information was generated from the 
fieldwork on the Establishment, Authority, Procedure, Capacity and Attitude of the 
Oversight and Audit Committee to make informed recommendations for the effective 
financial accountability in Stellenbosch Municipality.     
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CHAPTER 6:  RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
The chapter presents the findings, conclusion and recommendations.  The findings and 
recommendations are based on the data collection and analysis process of the study. The 
recommendations are informed by the findings and focus on issues of establishment, 
authority, procedures, capacity and the attitude of council committees to exercise financial 
accountability.     
 
The conclusion of this study is presented on the basis of the research questions and 
objectives.  
6.1.2 THE STUDY WAS  GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
? What are the major underlying factors that contribute to financial accountability at 
the local level? 
? What is the role of council committees in promoting financial accountability? 
? What are the strengths and weaknesses of Stellenbosch municipality’s municipal 
council committees? 
?  How can council committees be strengthened to play an effective role in 
Stellenbosch municipality’s municipal financial accountability? 
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6.1.3 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY WERE TO: 
?  Analyse the legislative and regulatory framework that guides local financial 
accountability in South Africa. 
?  Contextualize the role of the council committees to ensure effective and 
efficient financial accountability. 
?  Identify key factors that impact positively and negatively on the role of the 
council committees entrusted with the responsibility to promote financial 
accountability 
? Put forward recommendations based on the findings and analysis of the 
research. 
 
6.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
6.2.1 STELLENBOSCH MUNICIPALITY GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT  
A significant finding of the study is that the constant change of the executive structures of 
the Stellenbosch Municipality created political leadership instability which negatively 
impacted on the general governance environment. Inevitably, Oversight Committees were 
affected negatively.  For example, by the time the Oversight Committee considered the 
Annual Report, the executive structures, mainly, the Executive Mayor and the Mayoral 
Committee would have changed. This meant that, the parties and individuals who were 
initially in the executive during the financial year under review were no longer part of the 
executive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
The roles were now reversed and the current committee members now assess an Annual 
Report for a period when they were the executive in charge.  Therefore, the issue of 
accountability or answerability was merely to comply with the law rather than to hold the 
executive accountable. In addition, the constant political changes distorted the notion of 
who was a non-executive councillor. A case in point is one councillor who was part of the 
executive but as a result of the changes to the executive became a non-executive 
councillor.  The result thereof is that the councilor now participates in processes assessing 
the performance of the executive of which he was a member.   
 
This change in status inevitably compromises the objectivity and impartiality of the 
committee or individual councillor. Equally, the hostile relationship between parties 
impacted on the council-executive relations. Good governance principles such as 
openness, transparency and accountability were replaced by distrust which impacted on 
access to information and cooperation between parties. In the process decision-making 
was along party lines and committees lost sight of their responsibility and accountability 
ultimately suffered. 
 
6.3 ESTABLISHMENT 
Stellenbosch Municipality complied with the legislative and policy framework discussed in 
chapter 3 regarding the establishment of Audit and Oversight Committees. Both 
committees enjoyed the necessary credibility in respect of the manner in which they were 
established.  
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The findings though suggest that the independence of the committees was be 
compromised. Committee members in some instances acted in a partisan manner and 
assessed documents from a party political rather than a governance perspective.   
 In this way objectivity and impartiality was affected. The political instability resulted in 
positional changes between executive and non-executive positions.  Respondents clearly 
indicated that they believed that the necessary procedures were followed when both 
committees were established. This according to them provided committees with the 
required stature necessary among the other structures of the municipality. The Audit 
Committee member enjoys a high degree of credibility.  In the main this is attributed to the 
fact that they are experts in their field. 
 
6.4 AUTHORITY 
The assignment of authority generated much confusion among the respondents. The 
confusion emanated from the fact that authority was not formally delegated to the Oversight 
Committee.  Neither were the terms of reference clearly defined.  As a result, the Oversight 
Committee members were unclear about the authority with regard to key factors such as 
conducting independent analysis, the power to summon people to appear before the 
committee or the power to force people to provide additional information.   
 
A critical finding with regard to the granting of authority was that the executive dominance 
of the formulation and implementation of the budget is entrenched in the Stellenbosch 
Municipality.  The authority delegated to council committees was not effective in changing 
the practice and culture of executive structures’ dominance on the budget process. The 
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findings supported the view that effective budget accountability will require council 
committees to exercise scrutiny and oversight on all the stages of the budget process.  
According to the respondents’ experience, the authority of the Oversight Committee is 
limited and is confined to compiling an oversight report. This restriction in scope of 
responsibility negates the committee’s effective contribution to financial accountability.    
 
6.5 PROCEDURES USED BY COUNCIL COMMITTEES 
The procedure undertaken by the Oversight Committee is useful in as far as producing an 
oversight report on the municipality’s Annual Report is concerned.  Being a committee that 
is relegated to last stages which is auditing of the budget process, its effectiveness in terms 
of promoting financial accountability is not clear.   
 
Members of the Oversight Committee do not attach seriousness to the oversight report.  
This is mainly due to the fact that the report does not inform policy making.  It appears the 
report is mostly compiled for the sake of legislative compliance and not necessarily to make 
any meaningful changes in the operations of the municipality. The fact that many 
committee members were not aware of the main issues reflected in Section 71 reports 
presented to the Council by the Mayor highlighted a challenge in exercising continuous 
monitoring of the budget process.  
 
With regard to the Audit Committee there is a clear structure, processes and procedures 
with regard to their role.  Unlike the Oversight Committee, the Audit Committee had a clear 
agenda and focus.  Furthermore the fact that this committee is independent consisting of 
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external professionals enhanced the credibility, role and functions thereof. It is therefore 
impossible to make an opinion on the effectiveness of the meetings of the two committees.  
 
6.6 CAPACITY  
As indicated under the issue of establishment, the main concern influencing representation 
is multi-party representativeness. The issue of technical capacity and expertise is not 
considered as a requirement for appointment. This is the reason most Oversight Committee 
members indicated that a lack of technical capacity is a major impediment in their quest to 
do justice in terms of what is expected of them. In the same vein, the non-executive 
councillors indicated that a lack of time and accurate information on budget related matters 
does impact on their effectiveness. In addition, the regulated interaction between 
councillors and the administration made the task of getting clarity of financial issues more 
difficult. Also the hostile environment that existed in the Municipality made interaction 
between councillors and official difficult and limited.  
 
6.7 ATTITUDES OF COUNCIL COMMITTEES IN PROMOTING FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Oversight Committee members are part of a highly politically divided council.  Party political 
laarger mentality informs the decision making processes. Politician’s decision making is not 
informed by rationality but by party political mandate. This has resulted in committee 
members being partisan in practice.  The end result is that accountability is compromised. 
Another major finding is the general view that the council does not value recommendations 
regarding financial accountability. As a result, those who are aware of financial irregularities 
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in the municipality prefer to report them to external law enforcement agencies such as the 
police rather than first discussing them in the municipal council.  This in essentially means 
that the internal system of accountability is not trusted and more trust is placed in outside 
agencies to call the executive to account.   
 
6.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The study supports the view that legislative structures such as the municipal councils are 
an undisputed requirement for effective financial accountability.  In addition to other critical 
roles and responsibilities, municipal councils are required to be the custodians of public 
resources at local government level and that they need to provide leadership on the 
stewardship of these resources. Therefore, the findings of this study are expected to 
contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the efforts to strengthen the role of the 
municipal councils in financial accountability.  More importantly, the role and responsibilities 
of council committees to enhance the council oversight ability to hold the executive and the 
administrative structures accountable will improve service delivery and financial 
governance in municipalities. 
 
The study highlighted the significant role of the committees in assisting the Council to 
promote financial accountability.  The research findings indicated that without committees 
the council would be unable to undertake all the necessary activities to enable effective 
financial accountability. Similarly, the study revealed that a mere existence of the 
committees is not a guarantee that there will be effective financial accountability. This 
highlights the fact that complying with the law regarding establishment of the committees is 
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counter-productive. The establishment of Committees must promote the notion of ‘fit for 
purpose’ to ensure financial accountability.  Likewise, these Committees must be endowed 
with adequate authority to realise their purpose. The authority must be formally delegated 
to empower the Committees. The delegation must be comprehensive to enable 
Committees to access the required information and persons in the promotion of the 
financial accountability. 
 
The study confirmed the need for technical capacity for members of council committees 
without the required capacity, members serving on council committees will have difficulty in 
discharging their role. While the study was not focusing on the advantages or 
disadvantages of the impact of regular changes to the executive structure, indications are 
that in Stellenbosch Municipality this has brought about political and administrative 
instability. This instability negatively impacted on the work of the committees and 
subsequently suffered accountability in the municipality.        
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6.9 RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of recommendations are put forward stemming from the findings of the research. 
They are: 
I. The municipal council needs to create a culture of governance that promotes 
accountability, openness and transparency through its Rules of Order. Practices 
that compromise these principles must be discouraged. Where possible the 
municipal council should take action against offending parties. 
 
II. Financial accountability must be promoted throughout the year and not a once-off 
activity as is currently the situation. The council committees cannot exercise 
effective financial oversight only at the tail-end of the budget process. They must 
participate in all the stages of the budget process to ensure that they are neither 
disadvantaged nor dominated by the executive structures that tend to be much 
more informed about the budget issues than non-executive councillors.     
 
 
III.  The municipal council needs to assign the required authority such as access to 
information, the power to summon people to the committees and more importantly 
the power to demand that their recommendations get implemented by the municipal 
council.   
IV. Oversight Committee members must be trained in financial analysis and 
management. 
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V.  Additional administrative support should be provided to them to assist in complex 
financial matters. Committee members require these skills to develop an informed 
and meaningful input into the financial management processes of the municipality.  
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